The Unprecedented Nature of Moralogy as Revealed by a Survey of the History of Western Moral Science

Keisuke Kawakubo

Contents
1. Introduction
2. Western Moral Science
   (I) Moral philosophy and moral science
   (II) James Beattie's *Elements of Moral Science*
   (III) Francis Wayland's *The Elements of Moral Science*
   (IV) Leslie Stephen's *The Science of Ethics*
   (V) Other Great Moral Philosophers:
       Emerson, Sidgwick and Porter
3. The Appearance of Hiroike's Moralogy
   (I) The Genesis of Moralogy
   (II) Morality as Set Forth in *A Treatise on Moral Science*
   (III) Hiroike's Study of the Sages:
       The World of Supreme Morality
   (IV) The Application of Modern Sciences (from the end of the
        19th century to the 1920s) to the System of Moralogy
   (V) Hiroike's Methodology
4. The Future of Moralogy

1. Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to determine the significance of Chikuro Hiroike's Moralogy and the place that it occupies among the various moral sciences of the world. Hiroike chose *A Treatise on Moral Science: The First Attempt at Establishing Moralogy as a New Science* (1928) as the title for his *magnum opus*, but what exactly does the phrase “Morality as a New Science” mean? To understand it correctly, we need to be put in the historical context of Western moral science, and then try to explain how it differs from this tradition in terms of its methodology, content, and “unprecedented” substance (*Treatise, I, 39*). This will explain why Hiroike coined a new word, *Morality,*
to describe his unique creation.

The first usage of the term “moral science” recorded in the *OED* dates from 1828 and is found in G. Payne, *Elements of Mental and Moral Science*. But there is in fact an earlier example in a letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley of February 8, 1780: “O that moral science were in as fair a way of improvement, that men would cease to be wolves to each other, and that human beings would at length learn what they call improperly humanity!” (*The American Tradition in Literature*, 1990, p. 208). In the same year, 1780, Jeremy Bentham published *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, a utilitarian study of morality in which the term “moral science” was also used.

2. Western Moral Science

(I) Moral Philosophy and Moral Science

The *OED* notes that “Moral science has in recent times been used in the same senses as ‘moral philosophy.’” In the 17th and 18th centuries, the concept of science was synonymous with ‘philosophy’; Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan* (1651) provides clear evidence of this. So moral philosophy was, then, an early form of moral science.

(II) James Beattie’s *Elements of Moral Science*

Perhaps the first book whose title included the term “moral science” was James Beattie’s two-volume *Elements of Moral Science* (1790–1793). Born on October 25, 1735 in Kincardineshire, Scotland, Beattie was installed as Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at his alma mater, Marischal College, in 1760, at the tender age of 25. He published *An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Skepticism*, whose title places him among the Scottish ‘Common Sense’ philosophers who reacted against the assertion in David Hume’s metaphysical skepticism that common sense is illusionary and hence unreliable. Beattie, *per contra*, defended the basic soundness of common sense and used it as the basis of his moral science. Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) took a similar line.

The *Essay* gained Beattie much fame and was soon translated into French, German, and Dutch, as well as attracting much attention in the New World. *Elements of Moral Science*, his final work, dealt with a wide range of topics including psychology, the faculty of speech, language, sensation, consciousness, memory, and sympathy, among others. In it, he wrote, “The mind of man may be improved, in respect, first of action, and secondly, of knowledge. The practical part, therefore, of this Abstract philosophy consists of two parts,
Moral Philosophy (strictly so called), which treats of the improvements of active or moral powers; and Logic, which treats of the improvement of our intellectual faculties. Thus we see that the moral sciences may be reduced to four, Psychology, Natural Theology, Moral Philosophy, and Logic” (I, xiv-xv). The 1,126 pages of this voluminous but beautifully written work reveal Beattie as a widely-read and balanced late 18th century Scottish scholar. His attractive written style (he was also a poet of some renown) and learning should not, however, lead us to overlook his ardent Christian faith, for he strongly defends his belief in the immortality of the soul as well as religious and moral causality (I, 414–438). We can only briefly note that Beattie clearly stated in an age of slavery in the United States that racial segregation was not acceptable (II, 150–223). He did not go so far as to demand its abolition, which would have been premature, as we will see if we follow the development of Francis Wayland’s position on the issue in the successive revisions to his Moral Science after its initial publication in 1835. Nonetheless, Beattie’s Moral Science (whose contents place it in the tradition of moral philosophy) was clearly an outstanding book of its time.

(III) Francis Wayland’s The Elements of Moral Science

Wayland (1796–1865) had been pastor of the First Baptist Church of Boston between 1821 and 1826) before earning wider renown as the President of Brown University from 1827 to 1855). He published the first edition of The Elements in 1835 and its fame reached as far as Japan, where Wayland’s ideas were popularized by Yukichi Fukuzawa. According to The Elements (p. 17) “Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, is the Science of Moral Law,” while of moral causality, Wayland writes (p. 19), “In morals, the result is frequently long delayed; and the time of its occurrence is always uncertain.” Strangely enough, Hirokoe did not mention Wayland in his Treatise, though this is perhaps understandable given that Wayland’s Elements does not make any mention of the causal relationship between moral practice and the agent’s happiness; instead, it elucidates topics such as moral law, moral action, conscience, intention, the nature of virtue, self-love, prayer, the observance of the Sabbath, etc. Wayland supports his arguments mainly by his own reasoning, but also utilizes quotations from the Old and New Testaments, Shakespeare, Bishop Butler and Isaac Newton. A modern edition of The Elements, with a detailed introduction by Joseph L. Blau, was published by Harvard University Press in 1963.

The ethical topics treated in The Elements include: moral law; moral action: the moral quality of actions; conscience or the moral sense; the manner in which decisions of conscience are expressed; rules for moral conduct; the
nature of virtue; human happiness; self-love; natural religion; the relationship between natural and revealed religion; the Holy Scriptures (The Old Testament and the New Testament); love of God, or piety; the cultivation of a devotional spirit; prayer; the observance of the Sabbath; duties to men; justice and veracity; the duty of slaves (pp. 192-197—this part was revised in later editions, after the emancipation of the slaves was finally realized in the U.S.A. in 1865); the right of property; oaths; the general duty of chastity; the law of marriage; the rights and duties of parents and children; moral education (pp. 292-298); the duties of man as a member of civil society; the duties of citizens; the law of benevolence. All of these elements of the book try to lead us to benevolence, which is the mark of a true work of ethics.

(IV) Leslie Stephen

Stephen's fame rests in part on his role as the first editor-in-chief of the Dictionary of National Biography (1886-91); he oversaw the publication of the first 20 of its 26 volumes before retiring from the project because of overwork in 1891. His other main works include: The History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (1876); The Science of Ethics (1882); The English Utilitarians (1900); and English Literature and Society in the Eighteenth Century (1904). His daughter, Virginia Woolf (1882-1941) was an elegant author, feminist, essayist and publisher.

Published in 1882, nearly half a century after The Elements first appeared, Stephen's The Science of Ethics attempted to combine ethics with Darwin's theory of evolution. According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "[A]fter Spencer's Data, this is the first book which worked out an ethical view determined by the theory of evolution." In it, Stephen writes (p. 11), "The accepted test of true scientific knowledge is a power of prediction." He analyzed and discussed many topics connected with morality, including utility, individualism and society, race and social organization, the virtue of temperance and the virtue of truth, knowledge, conscience, shame, happiness as a criterion for living, utilitarianism, expediency, morality and happiness, moral discipline, self-sacrifice, and so forth in as much detail as his predecessors had done. He was obviously intent on elucidating moral causality, but as Hiroke sympathetically explained, Stephen failed in his enterprise because of the "imperfection of science generally, hopeless complexity of the problem of individual conduct, absence of a scientific psychology and so on" (see Section II, "Difficulties of Moral Science", pp. 9-21). Stephen himself wrote (p. 450) that "the science of ethics deals with realities" and concluded (p. 434) that "there is no absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness."
(V) Other great moral philosophers: Emerson, Sidgwick and Porter

Use of the phrase “moral science” became more widespread as the 19th century advanced; Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), the Sage of Concord, for example, used it in *The Conduct of Life* (*The Complete Works*, VI, 240–241), as did the great scholar Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), one of the most influential ethical philosophers of the Victorian era, whose work continues to exert a powerful influence on Anglo-American ethical and political theory. In his masterpiece, *The Methods of Ethics* (1st ed., 1874; 7th ed., 1901), Sidgwick argued that there are three basic approaches to ethics (egoistic hedonism, intuitionism, and universalistic hedonism), each of which provides a different definition of the ultimate goal of ethical conduct: with egoistic hedonism, the ultimate good is the private happiness of each individual; with intuitionism, it is moral virtue or perfection; while with universalistic hedonism, it is the general happiness of all individuals. Each approach differs in its definition of rational principles of conduct and its interpretation of moral duty, and Sidgwick took pains to try to determine the extent to which they are compatible or incompatible.

Noah Porter (1811–1892), President of Yale University, was, according to Herbert W. Schneider, “in many ways the greatest and most erudite of the professors of philosophy” (*A History of American Philosophy*, Forum Books New York, 1946, 1957, p. 163). Even so, in *The Elements of Moral Science: Theoretical and Practical* (1885), Porter only went so far as to say (p. 7) that, “moral science is the science of duty, and to study duty scientifically both psychologically and philosophically.” So in his analysis of moral science, “science” remained a matter of simply analyzing ethical terms such as duty, obligation, perception or volition. This, of course, was entirely understandable given the times in which he lived. Leslie Stephen wrote, as we have seen, of the contemporary “imperfection of science”, and society in general and the social sciences in particular conspired to leave us with the impression that the moral science of the time was rather old-fashioned. At best, the “science” in moral science was in part at least the science of the theory of evolution.

3. The Appearance of Hiroke’s Moralogy

After the First World War (1914–1918), Oswald Spengler published *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (1919–22) and T. S. Eliot wrote “The Waste Land” in 1922. People in the West, shocked that their homelands, the centers of civilization as they saw it, had become a battlefield between the Central Powers (Germany, Austria–Hungary and Turkey) and the Allied Powers (mainly France, Britain, Russia, Italy and Japan), awoke to the urgent need for world
peace. This meant that the environment in which moral science now operated was completely different from what it had been before the early 20th century, and it was in this context that Hiroike’s Moralogy made its appearance. It differed from all previous approaches to ethics or moral philosophy in being a science that examined the effects of the practice of morality. The word itself was a new coinage by Hiroike from *mos* (*mores*, *moralis*, meaning ‘moral’) and-*ogy* (‘study’ or ‘science’). The important stages in its creation and growth can be set forth as follows.

(1) The Genesis of Moralogy

There were several factors that influenced how Hiroike came to conceive of moralogy.

(i) The deepening of his interest in religion and thought through his engagement in the study of the Shrines of Ise, and his involvement with Tenrikyo, a sect of Shintoism. Hiroike was responsible compiling more than half of the fifty-one volumes of the *Kojiruien*, and his publications before the creation of Moralogy also included *The Shrines of Ise* (1908), *The Chinese Grammar, An Introduction to Far Eastern Law, and An Outline of Chinese Law*. He was awarded the Degree of LL. D. for *A Study of Ancient Kinship Law in China*, on December 10th, 1912. Thereafter he turned to the study of moralogy (*Treatise*, I, 26).

(ii) His health problems, stemming from overwork (1904), leading to a nervous breakdown (1909). Shattered by a nervous collapse, Hiroike underwent a radical conversion in his thinking, subtly hinted at in his confession that “my former efforts are after all self-interested and so my effort from now should be entirely for the benefit of others and world peace.” We will look examine his inner life in more detail below.

(iii) His work to alleviate social unrest. Labor problems had worsened since the start of the 20th century under the impact of socialism, syndicalism, war (especially World War I), etc.

(iv) The accumulated impact of great distress, notably the criticism leveled at him for his work for Tenrikyo and his consequent resignation from the organization. This sparked a vital change from devotion to a single religion to the building a comprehensive learning called moralogy. In this context, special attention needs to be to his *Isejingu, the Ancestral Shrine of the Japanese Emperors and the Fundamental Characters of Japan* (1915), where he explicitly describes how this happened. His account would be easy to understand if we could decipher his erudite Japanese, peppered as it is with many quotations from the *Kojiki, Nihoshoki*, and other Japanese classics, as well as old folk
sayings and traditions, Confucian classics such as the Great Learning (Ta hsueh), the Doctrine of the Mean (Chung yun), the Confucian Analects, the Mencius (Meng-tzu), the Book of Changes, the Yi-king, the Scripture of Documents, the Book of Songs or the Book of Poetry, the Record of Ritual, and the Spring and Autumn Annals. These would have been almost impossible to understand if they had been printed in an unpunctuated Chinese script, but Hiroike was thoughtful enough to put in punctuations marks, return marks, and kana to show the Japanese declensions. Hiroike's contemporaries, especially the descendants of the samurai class in of the Meiji and Taisho eras, were as familiar with the Chinese and Japanese classics as were the educated Westerners born at the end of the 19th century with the Greek and Latin classics, as Arnold J. Toynbee vividly describes (see his Experience [especially “Three Greek Educations,” pp. 10-45] Oxford University Press, 1969). In Hiroike’s case, he was even better placed than his contemporaries, since he had already published a lengthy study of classical Chinese Grammar (Works, vol. II). So for this kind of exercise he was on home ground.

(II) Morality as Set Forth in A Treatise on Moral Science

As can be seen from the titles of its first ten chapters reproduced below, the initial focus of this vast work is Morality.

Introduction
Chap. I What is Morality?
Chap. II Morality and the Perfection of Human Life
Chap. III The Given Causes of Man’s Division into Classes
Chap. IV Acquired Causes in the Making of Human Classes
Chap. V The Fundamental Principle Concerning the Spiritual and Material Life of Mankind
Chap. VI Observations on How Man’s Past Mental Activity Has Caused His Present Physique, Ways of Life and Future Destiny
Chap. VII Investigations into Instinct, Knowledge, Morality, Social Constitution, the Nature of Civilization, and the Happiness of Mankind, with Regard to Their Interrelations
Chap. VIII Observations on the Laws of Evolution and Degeneration of Mankind
Chap. IX (A) Errors in Modern Thought Concerning the way of Realizing Universal Peace and Happiness
Chap. IX (B) Errors in Policies and Methods Followed by Aristocrats, Multimillionaires, Capitalists and Landowners Concerning Labor Problems, Tenancy Disputes, National Enterprises of Public Welfare, Social
Work or Charity Work
Chap. X  Conventional or Ordinary Morality
1. The Morality of Justice
2. The Morality of the Refutation of Evils
3. The Morality of Obligation
4. Self-Respecting Morality
5. Customary Morality
6. Morality Consisting in Etiquette and Formalities
7. Short-Lived Morality
8. Sentimental Morality
9. The Morality of Defiance or Opposition
10. The Morality of Ignorance
11. Intellectual Morality
12. Strategic Morality
13. The Morality of Isms
14. The Morality of Compromise
15. Group Morality
16. The Morality of Utility
17. Children's Morality
18. The Morality of Condescension
19. Patronizing Morality or the Morality of Kindness
20. The Morality of Mental Culture
21. Superstitious Morality
22. Adulatory Morality
23. Morality for Amusement

(III) Hiroike's Study of the Sages: The World of Supreme Morality

The remainder of the *Treatise* treats of supreme morality. Chapter XI is entitled “On the Development of Civilization as a tendency and on the Qualitative Development of Morality” (*Treatise*, II, 109-144). It acts as a bridge between the previous account of conventional morality and the exposition of supreme morality that is to follow. Ordinary or conventional morality is said to be imperfect, while supreme morality, as practiced by the ancient sages of the East and West “may be likened to the polar star that shines brightly alone in its own sector of space” (*Treatise*, II, 111). Before embarking on his study of the sages, Hiroike cautiously praises cosmopolitanism and humanism, commending Hugo Grotius’ *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, 1625, Immanuel Kant’s *Zum ewigen Frieden*, Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations, and others.
Hiroike faced the problem of moral causality squarely in the *Treatise*. He tried to identify the causal link between moral practice and the fate of its practitioners by investigating not individuals (except for a few outstanding cases) but groups (*Treatise*, III, 383). A prerequisite for this kind of study is to define the different types of morality, such as conventional and supreme morality, and how the results of practicing each type vary. Such a causal study is not simple. A mere external interpretation of events is not enough, for unless we include the moral and religious perspectives, we cannot discover the deep significance of life. For example, Dr. Hiroike once wrote, “I happily suffered from a serious illness.” Under normal conditions, the word ‘happily’ would not be used in such a context, but Hiroike’s illness did in fact turn out to be a blessing and a vital stage on his path to enlightenment and salvation. As a result, he introduced the principle of perfecting one’s moral character into the realm of moral causality. Accepting this insight is the only way to solve our difficult, centuries-old problems.

In chapter XII (Those Who Have Practised Supreme Morality) Hiroike turned his attention to four of the five ancient sages (Socrates, Jesus, Buddha and Confucius). In discussing the life and moral doctrine of Socrates, Hiroike wrote, “He saw clearly that the prevailing ethical and political fallacies sprang from a total misconception of the meaning of truth, and that the problem of knowledge was the key to the entire situation” (*Treatise*, II, 151). For Hiroike, the death of Socrates and his lesson on esteem for the national ortholinon was especially important, and he quoted the words of Socrates on the subject carefully: “Do not forget justice,” he said, “in your (Crito’s) eagerness to save me (Socrates). Do not think of life as prior to justice” (*Treatise*, II, 163-164). Hiroike then went on to comment, “Indeed, Socrates’s daring acceptance of the death penalty in defence of the national law was his most important lesson to mankind, showing his respect for the national ortholinon for the protection of human welfare” (*Treatise*, II, 164). Nor did he neglect to discuss those who inherited the wisdom of Socrates, including Plato and Aristotle, in these matters.

At the start of his account of the life of Jesus Christ, Hiroike modestly noted that he did not write about Christianity as a specialist, and so he confined his account mostly to quotations from authorities on the subject, including Giovanni Papini, *The Story of Christ*; Thomas à Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ*; Hatano Seiichi, *Kirisutokyo no Kigen (The Origins of Christianity)*; A. C. Headlam, *St. Paul and Christianity*; J. Hastings, ed., *A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*; and Camden M. Cobern, *The New Archeological Discoveries and Their Bearing upon the New Testament and upon the Life of the Primitive*
Church. Nonetheless, Hiroike’s research in the matter was comprehensive for his day, and of course included the Old and the New Testaments, as well as other authoritative documents. Nor did he fail to treat all that he studied here in a fair and reasonable spirit, as for example when writing that “From the viewpoint of supreme morality these Ten Mosaic Commandments are not free from blemish as the representation of Jehovah as a ‘jealous God’ (Treatise, II, 178). He quoted the words of Jesus, “My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me” (John vii. 16) to show how he respected his ortholinon (Treatise, II, 191), and argued that repentance in Christianity “is identical in meaning with the phrase ‘well in communion with the wisdom of Buddha’, in the introductory chapter to The Lotus Sutra (Saddhara-parārāka-sūtra)” (Treatise, II, 185). Other topics that attracted his attention included the problem of the Messiah, the Crucifixion, the Christian faith and its interpretation, and St. Paul and the spread of Christianity into Europe.

Hiroike also treated Sakyamuni (Buddha) at considerable length, discussing his birth, his renunciation of the world and enlightenment, and the concept of nirvana. Sakyamuni (Siddhārtha Gautama) was born a prince of the Sakya clan on the border of Nepal in the 6th century B.C. Despite his upbringing as a rich aristocrat, he could not ignore the harsh realities of life, such as disease, old age, and mortality, and believed at first that the answer to suffering might be found in the life of one of the wandering ascetics he saw. So he renounced his privileged existence, and his wife and newly born-son, and practiced asceticism for seven years, fasting, enduring sleeplessness, and accepting other privations. But he still could not find wisdom; ascetic practice bore no fruit. According to the account by Ogiwara Unrai that Hiroike quotes, “Gotama...went to the foot of a pipal tree...spread kuṣa grass there, sat cross-legged upon it, facing east, rectifying himself and purifying his inner thought, and uttered a great vow: “If I should not realize unsurpassed wisdom, I would rather crush my body than ever leave this seat”...Samaṇa Gotama’s speculated introspection...was gradually systematized into...the ‘twelve-linked chain of causation’... [and] when the theory of causation was perfected, enlightenment came immediately...as if the rising sun shone out in the eastern sky and chased away the deep darkness of a long night” (Treatise, II, 235). From this we can see how, although Gautama shared our common human nature, after hard ascetic practice and intensive meditation he metamorphosed into an enlightened figure. Of the five sages described by Hiroike, Shakamuni is the most logical, meticulous and speculative in his thinking and self-discipline, and he impressed Hiroike with his respect for his ortholinons and steady pursuit of his ultimate ideal.

Hiroike once again focused on respect for ortholinons when describing the
attitude of Confucius towards the ortholinons of supreme morality in China before him, and in dealing with the views of Confucius and Si Ma Qian’s about the history of ancient China, and especially Yao of Tang, Shun of Yu, Yu of Xia, and Tang of Shang. He was well aware that Confucius was a great historian who consulted copious historical documents and assiduously visited many historic places when researching past rituals and traditions. Hiroike aptly cited the statement of Confucius recorded in *Lun Yu (The Analects of Confucius)—c. 600 B.C.*), “I simply narrate and do not make up, believe in and like the old times, and secretly I compare myself to wise Lao Peng [of Yin]... [on which Hiroike commented] Those sages in ancient China who preceded Confucius no doubt must have been of great virtue indeed. If, however, it had not been for Confucius, their virtue would have remained unknown to the world. Once Confucius explained the achievements of the sages, the spirit and nature of supreme morality in China was made clear for the first time. He was a man, who, as it were, compiled and perfected all into one” (*Treatise*, II, 344). He also noted that while other great Chinese historians stressed the important contributions of three sovereigns and five emperors, “Confucius...selected only Yao and Shun among the five emperors as the earliest sages of China because the two had acquired the surest and most distinguished virtue...To these two Confucius then added five more sages...and regarded the teachings and deeds of those seven sages as the source of all principles of politics, laws, education, economics, religion, etc.” (*Treatise*, II, 294). For Hiroike, then, the thinking of Confucius was saturated with history and the traditions of the sages. He quoted Confucius’ self-description as recorded in the *Analects*. “Ye Gong asked Zi Lu about the personality of Confucius. Zi Lu did not answer. The Master, hearing about this, said: ‘Why did you not say: ‘Once inspired he forgets meals; in joy of learning he forgets sorrows, so he is not aware of approaching old age; such is the nature of the man?’” (*Treatise*, II, 363).

Hiroike was deeply interested in the career and legacy of Confucius, and especially in how over the course of time he systematized supreme morality in China into belief in God, benevolence, compassion, golden mean, filial piety, etc. He noted that “Confucius had three thousand disciples... [but] only the ten most excellent...followed their master through his troubles in Chen and Cai...” (*Treatise*, II, 366), describing how he traveled around China, seeking out kings and princes who might adopt his teachings. But despite visiting some seventy states, he failed to persuade any of their rulers. In his sixties he came home to Lu, where he compiled his teachings. Although he was unable to persuade the rulers who were his contemporaries, after the Han Dynasty his doctrine was adopted and later introduced into Japan where it proved very influential.
Toynbee argued that China flourished before the Ming Dynasty, but deteriorat-
ed later and sometimes became hegemonic.

Hiroike chose to discuss Amaterasu Ōmikami separately from the other
four sages. In Chapter XIII (The Sacred virtue of Amaterasu Ōmikami Who
Laid the Foundations of Japan’s Imperial House, and the Real Cause of the
Unbroken Line of Succession of That House), the main sources used are the
Kojiki (A.D. 712) and the Nihonshoki (A.D. 720), the oldest historic documents
of Japan (though we should note that the Kojiki is more authentic than the
Nihonshoki, which is written in the Chinese style. The account begins with
divine and human genealogy; Amaterasu was the eldest daughter of Izanagi no
Mikoto and Izanami no Mikoto, whose second child was Tsukiyomi no Mikoto.
The third to be born, Susanoo no Mikoto, was an unruly boy who could not
keep from wrongdoing. But Amaterasu did not rebuke him for his evil deeds,
instead gracefully interpreting his misbehavior in a favorable manner. After
all her goodhearted attempts to reform her brother failed, she entered a rock
Cave and she examined her own conduct. Hiroike summarized the most
important moral qualities of his behavior as ‘Benevolence, Tolerance, and Self
-Examination,’ writing that, “According to classical scholars who have answ-
ered my [Hiroike’s] questions, what follows in the Kojiki version seems to mean
ultimately that the features of Amaterasu Ōmikami were reflected in the
mirror...since she was born so beautiful that according to the Nihonshoki, her
‘bright splendor penetrated all six sides’, after she had practiced self-discipline
in the secluded life of the Heavenly Cave, she showed the noblest of features
beyond comparison. Uzu Me no Mikoto then explained and Futotama no
Mikoto and Ame no Koyane no Mikoto immediately presented the mirror for
her inspection. Thereupon Amaterasu Ōmikami accepted the nation-wide
apology and came out of the Heavenly Cave so that the sun was again il-
luminating the universe. This is why she has the honorific title of Amaterasu
Ōmikami (the Great Deity that lightens all Heaven). That Amaterasu Ōmi-
kami’s features underwent change as a result of her seclusion in the Heavenly
Cave was reported by the ancient people. The existence of such a legend of the
ancient times when the sciences were not as well as developed as they are now
may probably be a proof that it existed as a fact” (Treatise, II, 452–3). This
account is reminiscent of the Transfiguration of Jesus Christ (Matt. 17: 1–13,
and Mark 9: 1–13) and the transfiguration of the Japanese Buddhist saint and
founder of the Shingon School, Kūkai (774–835), at Seiryouden Palace (Gen-
koushakusho).

It is clear that Hiroike was correct when he wrote, “In ancient Japan,
people loved the natural states of things, and took pride in their ‘country having
no altercation’ where there were no letter, grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, or 
logic” (Treatise, II, 424). After concealing herself in the rock cave and engag-
ing in self-examination, Amaterasu Ōmikami did not say anything, which is 
why Hiroike characterized her conduct as exemplifying ‘Benevolence, Toler-
ance and Self-examination.’

A great difference between Amaterasu Ōmikami and the other four world 
sages is that she presents herself as the national sovereign of Japan, whose task 
or mission is not only to govern Japan but also enlighten the ‘whole Japanese 
people. But the assumption that Japanese mythology was concerned purely 
with the divine and so was problem-free is untenable, since the divinities 
clearly had as many problems as ordinary human beings do. In fact, though 
described as kamis (gods), their behavior was not divine, but human. They 
were subject to various desires; some of the ‘mikoto,’ were naughty, disloyal, 
and disobedient to the commands of Amaterasu-Ōmikami. They repeatedly 
failed to inform her about the situation in Japan. Ame no Hohi no Kami, for 
example “flattered and cringed before Ōkuninonushi no Kami and did not 
report until three years had passed... Ame Wakahiko then went down to that 
land, married Shitatateruhime the daughter of Ōkuninonushi no Kami with the 
design of obtaining the country, and did not report until eight years had 
passed... [Eventually]...the command was given to Hikoho no Ninigino Mikoto: 
“This Central Land of the Reed Plains is the land for thee to rule. Therefore, 
according to the command, thou shalt descend from Heaven” (Treatise, II, 455 
-6). This command was finally carried out, but the whole process was riddled 
with negotiations and disputes.

Chapter XIV (The Principle, Substance and Content of Supreme Morality) 
is the centerpiece of this great work, and its contents are rich and profound. 
Here we can give only the briefest sketch of the subjects it treats: justice and 
benevolence; the theory of the Precedence of Duty over Right; self-renuncia-
tion; the principle of the Absolute God; the ortholinon principle; enlighten-
ment and salvation; pure orthodox learning.

These key elements are completely interrelated and linked together in a 
circular fashion, as the following extracts make clear. “From ages past the 
sages and men of great intelligence in the world generally considered the 
substance of God or Realty to be justice and benevolence” (Treatise, III, 23). 
“In Chinese philosophy...in Chapter Twenty of the Zhong Yong (Book of the 
Golden Mean):—‘Sincerity is the way of Heaven... ‘Here sincerity is in accord 
with natural law... and natural law is thus the expression of the mind of God’” 
(Treatise, III, 24). “In the West, interpretations of the natural law by philos-
ophers, ethicists and jurists are diversified, but they have the following basic
understanding in common: the natural law is the law of God and the essence of
the law is justice, that is, the mean, average, equality and the like” (Treatise, III,
25). “In Japanese tradition the deity to be identified with Reality is known as
Ame no Minakanushi no Kami; in Chinese tradition, Tian, Tian Di, or Shang
Di. In Buddhism, which at first had no positive interest in the idea of a
personal deity, Dharma or Dharmakāya corresponds in meaning. So does
Jehovah or God in Christianity. It must be noted that all these names are
suggestive of certain religious or racial associations and likely to be detri-
mental to the universal nature of God. In naming the object of its faith, supreme
morality adopts none of these parochial names...The second concept of kami, in
religious interpretations, is that of the incarnate God, alleged to be Reality
appearing a human form in actual human society...This traditional interpreta-
tion in religions...has certain difficulty in meeting the general rational thinking
of the day. ...In so far as history and reason can testify the only possible
interpretation after all is this: that the supreme moral practice of the incarnate
God caused him to be identified with the primal universal God” (Treatise, III, 97
that he was completely free from the four ills— arbitrariness, obstinacy, preju-
dice and selfishness. In Christianity, repentance means turning from egoism to
godliness. In Buddhism, the bodhisattva is said to be entirely selfless, having
both spirit and body immersed in the wisdom of Buddha. This selflessness, or
renunciation of self, is really an important moral creed if man is to enjoy
happiness, this one condition being the standard to distinguish a sage from an
ordinary person because all so-called sages are selfless (Treatise, III, 82–83).
As to the enlightenment and salvation, “The teachings and deeds of Socrates,
Christ, Sakyamuni and Confucius do not always appear to be the same. They
are in fact the same however, in that all four sages devoted themselves to the
enlightenment and salvation of the human spirit according to the great univer-
sal law of nature” (Treatise, II, 390).

Hiroike then moved on to elucidate supreme morality in order to build a
new civilization. In this sense he was very progressive. His writings about
Moralogy are quickened by the spirit of his sublimely enthusiastic aspiration.
Chapter XV (Observations on the effects of the practice of Supreme Morality)
brings his remarkable work to a close.

(IV) The Application of Modern Sciences (from the end of the 19th century to
the 1920s) to the System of Moralogy

Hiroike stated that “the system of moralogy is based on the principles of
the following branches of science:—geology, physical geography, biology, the
theory of evolution, genetics (including the theory of heredity), eugenics, ethnography, physiology, anthropology, ethnology, ethnology, archaeology jurisprudence, phrenology, psychology, sociology, criminology, the history of civilization, the history of systems of law, the history of political economy, the history of morality, and others” (Treatise, I, 84). One example of the application of the theory of evolution to the Buddhist doctrine of daśa dharma-dhātu (the ten realms of living beings) is as follows: there is a sequence that moves from asuras, tīryañcās, pretas or narakas, devas, śrāvakas (the original meaning here is someone who had the chance of hearing Buddha’s voice), to pratyekabuddhas (a person who tries to get enlightenment without his master, and does not try to save other people), to bodhisattvas (a Buddha elect, but one who has vowed to remain in the world to work for the enlightenment and salvation of others), and finally to tathāgatas (a person who has attained Buddhahood (cf. Treatise, III, 158). If Hiroike had known of Karl Jung, he might also have included a psychological interpretation of human nature in the Treatise.

(V) Hiroike's Methodology

Hiroike used a number of different approaches in constructing the Treatise. The first was historical research, which he used to trace the development of human beings from ancient times through to the medieval and modern eras. Secondly, he considered the physiological, mental and social development of an individual from infancy through childhood and youth to old age. Thirdly, he looked back across the generations for evidence of moral causality (see Shi Ji vol. xxxvi, and “The Descendants of the Ancient Sages” in the Treatise, II, 331 -337).

The final and unique aspect of his thinking was the distinction he drew between ordinary, or conventional, morality and supreme morality. The latter he found in the teachings of the world sages. Prior to the appearance of the Treatise, moral science had analyzed the themes of ethics minutely, had never categorized them in the way that Hiroike did in Chapters VIII to XI. His work leads us to ask: what is the scientific study of morality? To answer this we must define morality and its various classifications (including immorality, and conventional and supreme morality), and also employ psychological analysis and sociological approaches. Any scientific study of the effects of moral practice must consider the issue of utilitarianism, while with regard to the perfecting of the human character, it must examine Sidgwick’s belief that moral practice and the happiness of its practitioners coincide roughly but not completely. In the matter of moral causality, research into groups rather than
individuals may be appropriate, though it is also useful to examine the biographies of eminent individuals, their destinies and their moral practice. Such freshness of approach will justify the claim that Hiroike’s method was indeed ‘unprecedented’ (Treatise, I, 39).

Morality differs from what is commonly understood as ethics. Ethics is a science which studies duty, goodness and justice. It starts not with heavenly issues, but with questions about human acts, and about our social and historical happiness and unhappiness on this earth. In Morality, however, the object of study metamorphoses from conventional to supreme morality. Science is usually based on concrete facts, not transcendental concerns, but the Treatise moves from moral science (chapters I–XI) to meta–moral science (chapters XIII–XV), from social facts to the transcendental realm. This is very similar to Toynbee’s idea of a movement from history to meta–history, which I have described elsewhere (Kawakubo, 2000, pp. 95–102).

4. The Future of Morality

The general current of thought today is democratic and individualistic, though this trend is sometimes criticized. In this context, Morallogical thought can seem to be conservative, and indeed it is so. But this is because we are in too much haste to pause and think in terms of a time span of many generations and centuries. American thought is, generally speaking, democratic and individualistic. In his Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) used the word “individualism” to denote the American national character for the first time. Mark Twain wrote The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1844) depicting the Duke and King are rapscallions and royalty itself as merely an accepted imposture on a raft on the Mississippi. Such figures are uprooted people, as Oscar Handlin (1951) argues. Aristocratic rank had no worth on the frontier and American society is outwardly one of equality: man is created equal. In reality, however, there are big discrepancies between and among social and financial classes. Recently, some business leaders have shamelessly taken huge bonuses in spite of the bankruptcy of their own companies, as Benjamin Barber (1992) has described. Hiroike, though, could still praise American Independence and the country’s national character, as well as such founding fathers as George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin (see the Treatise, III, 147 and elsewhere).

In his fascinating books (1904–1913: 1907–1918) about medieval Europe and the modern era, Henry Adams notes that the 13th century had an integral symbol of faith in the Virgin, and the 20th century had the dynamo. However
we cannot go back to 13th century Europe, when man had the highest ideal of himself as a unit in a unified universe, however good this might have been. We have many problems, such as global warming, the environment, disturbances to the global ecosystem, the manipulation of life by medical and nuclear technology, and so forth. In this cosmic 21st century, this means the urgent need for us is to have the wisdom and courage to follow the path of supreme morality.

References
Vol. I  
a. The History of “Nakatsu”
b. An Unauthorized History of Japanese Imperial Family
Vol. II  
Vol. III  
a. An Introduction to Far Eastern Law
b. An Outline of Chinese Law
Vol. IV  
a. Isejingu, the Ancestral Shrine of the Japanese Emperors and the Fundamental Characters of Japan
b. The Origin of the Japanese Constitution
c. Suggestions to Capitalists, Directors, Managers, and Governmental Officials
Spengler, Oswald (1918–22). Der Untergang des Abendlandes.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. in America (Henry Reeve text a revised by Francis Bowen, 2 vols.
Twain, Mark (1884). The Adventure of Huckleberry Finn.
Wayland, Francis (1835). The Elements of Moral Science.