Chikuro Hiroike and
the Nature of Moral Causality

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In his treatment of moral causality in *Towards Supreme Morality*, Chikuro Hiroike set out to achieve for moralogy something extremely difficult, something that, given the resistance it encounters from human nature, can in fact often seem close to impossible. He wished to hold in conjunction two things that are very reluctant to co-exist, as when one tries to bring and hold together the north poles of two magnets. One of these poles was his unshakeable belief in the moral fabric of human experience, which for him was simply a necessary recognition of the moral structure of reality, of the universe. As he put it,

Moralogy is a science...which proves scientifically that when the results of moral practice are seen from an outsider’s viewpoint the practice of morality always benefits the executant, and thereby clarifies the causal law that exists for man’s conduct.\(^1\)

So good actions produce good results and, correspondingly, evil actions evil results. This latter point is, for Hiroike, perhaps the more crucial of the two, because it

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scotches the notion that immoral actions can ever bring genuine rewards. He went to great pains to emphasize the truth of this, and insisted on the need to make that truth completely clear, because

People in general...are greatly influenced by the surprisingly mistaken idea that those who practice morality suffer loss while those who carry out immorality skillfully by employing various means are benefited. Moralogy, however, teaches clearly and accurately, that the practice of morality or immorality makes its executant directly and acutely responsible and leads him to the result—happiness or unhappiness, respectively, which is to be brought about sooner or later. 2)

Human experience provides support in plenty for Hiroike’s contention that those who do not believe in moral causality, or who ignore it, put themselves (and others) in danger. For those who act immorally do so in the belief that nothing untoward will inevitably happen to them, and that they are free to harm others without fear of retribution. This mistaken belief, or refusal to believe, means that a repeated insistence on the reality of moral causality is indeed indispensable to advancing the cause of morality itself. For just as there is moral causality, so there is also immoral causality, the existence and workings of which have been verified by the experience of every human generation. In particular, many of those born during and since the lifetime of Chikuro Hiroike had ample opportunity to observe immoral causality in action, providing they were permitted to survive the pressures of the 20th century. For their lives were conditioned by regimes which believed dogmatically that the ends justified any means, and that no harm would come to the perpetrators of any action providing the aims appeared to be lofty enough. The truth proved to be far otherwise. Vaclav Havel, for instance, has written on a number of occasions of how im-

2) Ibid., 398.
moral methods cannot produce any other that immoral results, and of how it was inevitable that followers of ideolo-
gies (and, in particular, of the various brands of Communism
that plagued the 20th century) which ignored this could not
create anything other than a hell on earth. Particularly
dangerous, as he saw, was a willingness to use violence to
advance a cause,

‘...since violence, as we know, breeds more violence. This is
why most revolutions degenerate into dictatorships that devour
their young, giving rise to new revolutionaries who prepare for
new violence...'\(^3\)

A belief in the inescapable nature of this law had, of
course, been taken deep root long before the spiraling course
of the French Revolution (and those in Russia, China and
elsewhere) offered further proofs of it, for as Alexander
Solzhenitsyn noted, ‘From the most ancient times justice has
been a two-part concept: virtue triumphs, and vice is puni-
shed.'\(^4\) It had long ago been an important component of
the religious understanding of the world, as evidenced, for exa-
ample, in the biblical warnings, ‘Vengeance is Mine; I will repay,
saith the Lord’, and ‘Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for
whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.'\(^5\)

Yet if it had been known for many ages that one cannot get
fruit from a stone, the corollary of this, the belief that good
actions bring good results, has proved to be nowhere near
such an easy matter. When Chikuro Hiroike wrote, as noted
above, that ‘when the results of moral practice are seen from

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   Exactly the same point has been made by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and Hiroike
   himself was careful to include in TSM (III, 417) the remark by Leopold von Ranke
   that ‘France...had to suffer terribly for the crimes of the revolution’.
   175.
5) Romans 12: 19, quoting Deuteronomy 32: 35, and Galatians 6-7. The second of
   these quotes was included by Hiroike in *TSM*, III, 402.
an outsider's viewpoint the practice of morality always benefits the executant', he was very careful to include that phrase, 'from an outsider's viewpoint'. The reason he did so points to the second, seemingly incompatible, pole of his thinking on moral causality. For just as strong as his wish to demonstrate the existence of moral causality was his desire to discourage the perversion of this insight, the perversion of agreeing to behave morally merely because one expects to be rewarded for doing so. Once again, he writes very clearly on this point.

If anybody misunderstand this principle of moralogy and makes his selfish desire the motive, purpose and method of his practice, the results will all go against what moralogy teaches.6)

But such misunderstanding is all too common, since as Hiroike acknowledged, 'It is impossible for a man to go on practicing morality with a sense of security unless the results can be proved more or less to be as good as expected, though it does not always turn out exactly so.'7) So how is one to discourage people from making this connection between the act and its results, given the considerable power that self-interest wields over human beings? Of course by warnings (and Towards Supreme Morality is full of them) that it is a false step, a complete misunderstanding of the nature of moralogy which can never produce the expected results.

Such a man in such a case will become skeptical about the teachings of moralogy without realizing that his own misunderstanding has prevented his practice from obtaining good results; and he will finally give up the practice of morality and meet such misfortunes as invite a rapid ruin.8)

The warnings are necessary, but still there is a puzzle.

6) TSM, III, 395.
7) Ibid., 394. But as Hiroike pointed out in an important footnote to this passage, this seeking for self-advantage does not happen in the case of 'a sage or a person of extraordinary psychology.'
8) Ibid., 395.
Chikuro Hiroike was completely convinced that there was clear and irrefutable evidence for the existence of moral causality. But why, in that case, are human beings unable to take advantage of their understanding and use this knowledge of the world for their own calculating self-interest? For there is clearly something in the very nature of moral causality that makes it impossible to abuse it for the purposes of calculation, prediction and exploitation. Why, as Hiroike says, are those who attempt to use it for their selfish desires doomed to disappointment? Such a conclusion seems very strange. An understanding of moral causality is a form of knowledge, and the incantation that knowledge is power is repeated daily. Yet in this case, perhaps uniquely so, human beings have knowledge, but they cannot make use of it. It confers no power. We cannot use our understanding of moral causality to control the present or the future, to shape either to our own advantage. What is it, then, about our perception of moral causality that sets it apart different from other forms of human knowledge?

Part of the answer that Chikuro Hiroike gives to these questions is that the results of moral actions take varying and unpredictable periods of time to become apparent. As he wrote, any investigation into the effects of moral causality must take account of the following.

1. The causal relationship is not very simple.
2. Fortunes are not the result of only one generation’s performance.
3. The effects of causality may not be determined in a short time.\(^9\)

This question of the time span involved, and of the consequent need to be able to wait patiently for the outcome, is mirrored in the often quoted epigram of the 17\(^{th}\) century

\(^9\) Ibid., 392
German thinker, Friedrich, Freiherr von Lagau.

‘Though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small;
Though with patience He stands waiting, with exactness grinds He all.’

Given that self-interest and patience seldom go together, the issue of timescale may well be sufficient, of itself, to turn a selfish individual to despair, for while morally good acts will indeed have good results, these will not appear at the time of our choosing. They need to be waited for. But such self-restraint is no part of the ‘policy’ of those who act morally in the belief that reward should follow, since this kind of action is in fact an attempt not merely to bargain with God, but actually to set conditions. For in every such offer to live a moral life there is a hidden expectation, involving some form of profit for oneself, together with a hidden timescale, usually short. On these grounds alone such an expectation is doomed to unfulfilment, for as Hiroike wrote, if someone

...neglects out of his selfishness to perform supreme morality in the correct manner but unconsciously comes to practise it in the manner of a policy, then whatever great good he may do, his spirit immediately takes on the aspect of the motive and purpose of conventional morality. He will then say that, contrary to the theory of morality, the effects of his moral practice are thus not up to his expectations.

Even worse than the need to wait, for the selfish individual, are the possibilities that the results of a good action may not appear in his own lifetime, since ‘Fortunes are not the result of only one generation’s performance’, and even that these results may benefit others, not himself.

Disappointing though all this may be to the self-interested, it is in fact a source of real hope, an encouragement to act

11) TSM, III, 395.
morally, since its meaning is that moral acts are gifts freely given to others, and there is the promise that such actions may benefit those who are completely unknown to the original doer of the deed. As such, they are gifts to humanity, for over such actions the giver has no further control. Such actions disappear from view along a path through the intricate web of human relationships that extends far through time and space, a good deed being launched on an eternal voyage and soon passing out of the sight of its creator into regions and then eras unknowable. An understanding of this aspect of causality, too, is very old. It underlies two aphorisms in Aesop’s fables, one that ‘No act of kindness, no matter how small, is ever wasted’, and the other that ‘The memory of a good deed lives on.’ The unseen consequences of a good act are, then, a form of immortality. They cannot be perceived, though, by the selfish individual who, fatally shortsighted, blinds himself to these realities and convinces himself that the only results that matter (or, indeed, that can ever exist) are those that are immediately visible and beneficial to himself alone.

But if the fruits of moral causality may not reveal themselves to the person who sets off a chain reaction of goodness, how is the individual to find proof of the existence of moral causality? One readily available resource here is self-examination, for perhaps the easiest, and also the most difficult, place to look for the results of one’s actions it is within oneself. One illustration of this is a story recounted from his own experiences in the Soviet Gulag by Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

‘...Following an operation, I am lying in the surgical ward of a [prison] camp hospital. I cannot move. I am hot and feverish, but nonetheless my thoughts do not dissolve into delirium—and I am grateful to Dr. Boris Nikolayevich Kornfeld, who is
sitting beside my cot and talking to me all evening...Fervently, he tells me the long story of his conversion from Judaism to Christianity...’

‘It is already late. All the hospital is asleep. Kornfeld is ending his story thus:

“And on the whole, do you know, I have become convinced that there is no punishment that comes to us in this life on earth which is undeserved. Superficially it can have nothing to do with what we are guilty of in actual fact, but if you go over your life with a fine-tooth comb and ponder it deeply, you will always be able to hunt down that transgression of yours for which you have now received this blow.’”

This is the most rigorous form of self-examination that one can envisage, and its self-honesty is palpable. But even though Kornfeld’s account of his understanding of the inescapable workings of moral causality is given further weight by the fact that it was the final action of his life (for he was killed early the following morning), it is still an insight that needs delicate handling. For it can only be applied to oneself and not to others, as Solzhenitsyn recognized when reflecting on Kornfeld’s last thoughts.

I would have been inclined to endow his words with the significance of a universal law of life. However, one can get all tangled up that way. One would have to admit that on that basis those who had been punished even more cruelly than with prison—those shot, burned at the stake—were some sort of super-evil doers. (And yet...the innocent are those who get punished most zealously of all)...

But there was something in Kornfeld’s last words that touched a sensitive chord, and that I accept completely for myself. And many others will accept the same for themselves.¹²)

It is impossible, then, to sit in categorical judgment on others, to assert unassailably that their sufferings are the clear results of the workings of moral causality. But Solzhenitsyn is right. One can have inner knowledge of its

workings within oneself, and Hiroike's insistence on the importance of his own experience with self-examination is evidence that he, too, recognized that this was so.

But categorical judgments aside, is there still not some degree of external knowledge possible for us, glimpses of moral causality at work in the lives of others? Certainly things here are difficult, because we have such limited knowledge of the inner, private lives of others and of the full range of the connections between individuals. It is also the case that what is at work in such relationships leaves such faint and indecipherable marks on the historical record, seldom providing overt matter for documentation. But even were there the evidence, there would still be very large questions of interpretation to face. Is all suffering a punishment for one's own actions? What, then, of the very young who die in great pain? Or is there in truth unmerited punishment? Or may there be punishment on account of others, as with the 'jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation'?¹³ For if an act of kindness may find its way across the wide spaces of the earth and its generations, may it not equally be the case that the evil we do lives on after us, that we are responsible for bringing harm as well as good to those we can never see or know?

Once more, the fullness of the evidence needed to judge this is seldom, if ever, made available to humanity. Yet the search for an understanding of moral causality at work in the world at large has preoccupied many. As a devoted student of the past, it was natural for Hiroike to search for evidence of the workings of moral causality in history, and amongst the proofs to which he recurs most often is the example of the continuity of the family line in Japan and elsewhere.

¹³) Exodus 20: 5.
‘...I have been able to verify rationally and clearly the fact that the practice of supreme morality by Amaterasu Ōmikami, the ancestress of the imperial house of Japan, is one of the most significant factors responsible for the unbroken line of succession of the house in terms of both the sovereignty of Japan and the prosperity of the family lineage. I have also proved the existence and prosperity of many unbroken lineages of those who once served the ancestress practicing supreme morality under the influence of her virtues: they remain as members of the Japanese peerage surrounding the imperial house. Moreover, I have disclosed the fact that in China the descendants of Confucius and Yan Hei are to be found still living today with high rank and honour. I was quite surprised when I found that the practice of supreme morality had resulted in the perpetuity of the descendants of its exponents similarly both in Japan and China. At the same time I was strongly convinced of the enormous effects of supreme morality and I could not help realizing, in particular, the great significance of the unbroken line of succession of the imperial family in Japan.\textsuperscript{14)}

It might be objected that such reasoning is a matter of inference, of deduction, rather than strict historical proof from documentary sources. But there is, in reality, no other way to proceed. Of the actual trajectory of each act of supreme morality, the evidence is elusive, because it so seldom finds its way directly to paper. Everything depends on the significance that we read into what has been left to us by those who have gone before. That significance is often very personal in character, involving the interaction of particular aspects of the past and what happens to us in the present. Each one of us may have our own unique insight, gained through personal experience. As illustration of the very individual nature of our glimpses into moral causality, here is a second story from the life of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, this one about the time when he himself was in danger of being recruited into the ranks of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police,

\textsuperscript{14)} \textit{TSM}, III, 382.
and on the brink of embarking on the life of a torturer and executioner.

‘I remember my third year at the university, in the fall of 1938. We young men of the Komsomol were summoned before the District Komsomol Committee not once but twice. Scarcely bothering to ask our consent, they shoved an application form at us: You’ve had enough physics, mathematics, and chemistry; it’s more important for you to enter the NKVD school...

It would be hard to identify the exact source of that inner intuition, not founded on rational argument, which prompted our refusal to enter the NKVD schools...Our feelings could not be put into words—and even if we had found the words, fear would have prevented our speaking them aloud to one another. It was not our minds that resisted but something inside our breasts. People can shout at you from all sides: “You must!” And your own head can be saying also: “You must!” But inside your breast there is a sense of revulsion, repudiation. I don’t want to. It makes me feel sick. Do what you want without me; I want no part of it.’

But, Solzhenitsyn came to understand later, this revulsion was not just a matter of the present, of a purely contemporary individual reaction. Rather, it

‘...came from very far back, quite likely as far back as Lermontov, from those decades of Russian life when frankly and openly there was no worse and no more vile branch of the service for a decent person than that of the gendarmerie. No, it went back even further. Without even knowing it ourselves, we were ransomed by the small change in coppers that was left from the golden coins our great-grandfathers had expended, at a time when morality was not considered relative and when the distinction between good and evil was very simply perceived by the heart.’\(^{15}\)

In this instance, the acts of those three generations in the past are seen as having an important influence for good, but it is immediately obvious here that such links still retain an element of mystery and are not susceptible to the orthodox

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canons of historical proof. Moral causation does not move in straight lines, nor is it necessarily constant in its operation—the billiard ball analogy is completely inadequate to capture its workings, not least because all the consequences of past actions have yet to unfold.

Perhaps one of the most reliable trace elements for detecting moral causality at work is the presence of irony, the strange and involved manner in which human beings contribute to their own punishment by seeking to anticipate the future and, by relying on their own belief in how that future will unfold, help to bring about something very different. Irony manifests itself in the contradictory nature of actions and their consequences, in how the things done in accordance with a mistaken belief in one's ability to read and shape the future work, in reality, to bring about one's own punishment. The revelation of the hidden course of moral causation, beyond all human powers of prediction, and the manner in which it suddenly reveals itself to the shocked individual, brings out in full measure the ironical nature of a self-unfulfilling prophecy. The experience of such a moment of truth has fascinated the most gifted observers of humanity since the dawn of modern civilization. *Oedipus Rex* is, on one level, the story of the intricate working out of the consequences of acts, the murder of Laius and his marriage with Jocasta, the true significance of which Oedipus was unaware of at the time he committed them. Those consequences took time to reveal themselves, and they did so only with the active cooperation, indeed at the prompting, of Oedipus himself, to his own destruction. In one sense, the play serves as a warning about the how little we know of the present or the past, and especially about the full significance of what has happened, illustrating how much of the workings of moral causality is hidden from us rather than how much we know of them. That same
element of the mysterious is there too in *Macbeth*, where once again an individual is trapped in the consequences of his own acts, consequences that he misunderstands because he relies on a false self-prophecy, inevitably to his own destruction.

It is a theme that replays itself constantly. Japan has recently been absorbed by the story of Sergeant Charles Jenkins, who deserted to North Korea in 1965 in the expectation that he would soon be repatriated to the U.S. and avoid service in Vietnam. Instead, he was kept in the country until 2004, so that when finally allowed to leave for Japan to face U.S. military justice, ‘After hearing bleak testimony about his harsh life in North Korea, an Army judge seemed to accept a defense lawyer’s argument that Sergeant Jenkins, 64, had “already suffered 40 years of confinement.”’

Part of the fascination of the story lies in this recognition that Jenkins, seeking what he took to be freedom, walked all unknowing into one of the worst (open) prisons in the world and sentenced himself to his own punishment. Perhaps his fate, including the elements of his marriage and eventual release, sheds light, even for external observers, on the continued mysterious inner workings of moral causality.

As we have seen, Hiroike-sensei noted that he was ‘quite surprised when I found that the practice of supreme morality had resulted in the perpetuity of the descendants of its exponents similarly both in Japan and China’, and this reaction, one of surprise, repeats itself whenever such discoveries are made. But why should the results of causality surprise us? For surely the whole point of understanding causality is to enable us to show that what happened in the past was entirely predictable and, by extension, to use that understanding to

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allow us to predict what will occur in the future. Why can be surprising about the predictable? The fact that the workings of moral causality do indeed surprise us is evidence that there is no place for determinism in our understanding of it. For according to one readily accessible explanation of determinism,

‘Determinism in the West is often associated with Newtonian physics, which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed, knowable laws. The “billiard ball” hypothesis, a product of Newtonian physics, argues that once the initial conditions of the universe have been established the rest of the history of the universe follows inevitably. If it were actually possible to have complete knowledge of physical matter and all of the laws governing that matter at any one time, then it would be theoretically possible to compute the time and place of every event that will ever occur (Laplace’s demon). In this sense, the basic particles of the universe operate in the same fashion as the rolling balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each other in predictable ways to produce predictable results.’

The consequences of this belief for morality are serious, since ‘The deterministic world-view is one in which the universe is nothing more than a chain of events following one after another according to the law of cause and effect. According to incompatibilists holding this worldview there is no such thing as “free will”, and therefore, no such thing as morality.’ Clearly such conclusions would be entirely unacceptable to Hiroike, but it is certainly the case that he did himself use phrases such as ‘the law of cause and effect’, and that he did write as follows.

‘The causality in man’s mental activity and conduct has the same fundamental principle as that of physical causality; namely,

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cause A will have the result A, while cause B will have the result B.\textsuperscript{19)}

However, while this may in one respect resemble physical causality, in another the two things are very different. Hiroike’s concern in this passage was to stress that good actions (A) lead to good results (A), while bad actions (B) lead to bad results (B), which was in keeping with his belief that immoral acts can be of no benefit to those who commit them. This in itself is enough to show that Hiroike believed in the essential role of moral choice, and so his words in no way imply an acceptance of the ‘billiard ball’ analogy by which the consequences of an action are (theoretically, at least) entirely predictable. But, if so, we are still in need of some other description of reality to replace that of the Newtonian interaction of billiard balls. One such is offered by the great Russian writer, Boris Pasternak, who, when reflecting on his novel, \textit{Dr. Zhivago}, wrote,

‘...the nineteenth century applied the incontestable doctrine of causality, the belief that the objectivity was determined and ruled by an iron chain of causes and effects, that all appearances of the moral and material world were subordinate to the law of sequels and retributions...

I...from my earliest years have been struck by the observation that existence was more original, extraordinary, and inexplicable than any of its separate astonishing incidents and facts...

If I had to represent a broad, a large picture of living reality, I would not hope to heighten its sense of \textit{extant objectivity} by accentuating the fixed statics of \textsuperscript{19}\textit{άνάγκη}; of natural laws, of settled moral regularity.

...There is an effort in the novel to represent the whole sequence of facts and beings and happenings like some moving entirety, like a developing, passing by, rolling, rushing inspiration, as if reality itself had freedom and choice and was composing itself out of numberless variants and versions.\textsuperscript{20)
This conception of reality constantly ‘composing itself’ is a necessary part of any attempt to represent human experience in its fullness, since the element of choice at both the individual and collective levels lies at its heart, and choice is, by its nature, unpredictable in its effects. The law of causality in which Hiroike-sensei believed was very restricted in its scope. It said only that immoral actions cannot produce good results, but it did not attempt to specify in any individual case how the actual result would work itself out. It could not do so because this would mean violating the self-composing essence of reality, in which human action plays an important but—given the existence of choice—an entirely unpredictable part. Certainly the past has its influence on the present—no one was more aware of that than Hiroike himself. But to say the past determines the present goes much too far—so far, indeed, as to undermine the essence of morality.

And this is a further reason why an understanding of moral causality cannot be used by humans for their own self-interest, for the future is genuinely unknowable, something that was also entirely clear to Pasternak.

“‘The future is the worst of all abstractions. The future never comes in the form you expect. Or wouldn’t it be truer to say that it never in fact comes at all? If you expect X to happen and Y happens instead, how can you say it was what you expected? Everything that exists does so only within the framework of the present.’”

So those who attempt to use an awareness of moral causality in pursuit of ‘policy’ are, as Hiroike argued, asking the impossible and doomed by the nature of reality to disappointment. But even if they were able to circumvent the workings of the world, there would still remain one final obstacle in

their path.

Those who seek to use the fact of moral causality for their own ends intend their calculations to produce happiness. Hiroike himself believed a link did indeed exist between the two, writing that it is

‘...quite clear that the study of moralogy, particularly concerning the causality in men’s mental activity and conduct, has a very important connection with the attainment of the development and happiness of mankind.’

But in what does happiness consist? Hiroike often stressed health as one important component, and there are others who agree with him in seeing this as one of the results of trying to act morally.

‘“There is nothing more beneficial for the health than straightforwardness, candour, sincerity and an easy conscience. If I were a doctor I would write a study on the danger of habitual duplicity to physical health. It is worse than alcoholism...”’

But there is more even than this. Solzhenitsyn, confronting the problem of why those doing evil seemed to prosper, suggested that ‘...the solution to this would be that the meaning of earthly existence lies not, as we have grown used to thinking, in prospering, but...in the development of the soul. From that point of view our torturers have been punished most horribly of all: they are turning into swine, they are departing downward from humanity.’ Hiroike, too, wrote that the most important task facing a human beings was the perfecting of one’s character, and it is possible to see in this an injunction to strive to live in accordance with one’s own real, one’s better nature, and thereby to achieve wholeness, integ-

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22) *TSM*, III, 400.
23) Gladkov, *Meetings with Pasternak*, p. 88. This was not romantic fiction but strict fact—living proofs of it Pasternak could see everywhere around him on a daily basis, in the faces and physiques of all those members of the Writers’ Union who chose to exist within the lie.
rity. If happiness consists in this, then to attempt to treat moral causality as a tool for the pursuit of self-interest is, as Hiroike argued, to set off in exactly the wrong direction, on a journey that can only end, ironically enough, with the self-destruction of character.\(^{25}\) Such a journey is, in itself, one further example of moral causality at work.

\(^{25}\) In his treatment of moral causality in *Towards Superme Morality*, Hiroike took care to include a quotation on the subject of character from James Hastings, ed., *A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, to the effect that 'Reward consists not in having certain things, but in seeing God. It is the result of character and the fruition of character... Christ did not so much change the place and time of happiness as alter its conception. He transformed the idea of retribution, connecting it not with the isolated act, but with the permanent character that lies behind the act.' (*TSM*, III, 401)